

Self-Fulfilling Credit Scores

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Abstract

A decline in credit scores can worsen the borrower's financial position, making default a self-fulfilling prophecy. We estimate the causal effect of credit scores on default using a rule that counts multiple inquiries within 14 days as one, moving scores without changing credit reports. Regression discontinuity estimates around the 14-day cutoff show that an additional counted inquiry lowers scores by five points on average. Default does not respond among consumers with clean records, but rises by 3.2 percentage points over two years among those with prior derogatories. For these consumers, at least 13 percent of the relationship between scores and default is self-fulfilling. We show that scorers would want to limit self-fulfilling defaults if their objective is forecast accuracy, but not if it is separating defaulters from non-defaulters, because that objective rewards the score for the defaults it causes.

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1 Introduction

Consumers with the lowest credit scores are over 60 times more likely to become seriously delinquent than those with the highest scores.¹ Because credit scores predict future default, they are widely used by lenders when deciding who obtains a loan and on what terms. A decline in credit scores may therefore tighten access to credit and worsen the borrower’s financial position, so that default becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If so, some of the large individual and societal costs of default are potentially avoidable consequences of credit scoring itself.

Estimating the causal effect of credit scores on default is challenging because it requires a change in scores that is orthogonal to other drivers of default. Ordinary movements in credit scores clearly do not meet this standard, as scores are designed to fall precisely when a borrower becomes more likely to default. Even plausibly exogenous changes to a borrower’s credit report, such as the removal of bankruptcy flags and other derogatory information, do not meet it. Credit reports are used directly by lenders, employers, landlords, and insurers, and thus changing the content of a report can directly affect the borrower through any of these uses, and not solely through credit scores.

This paper uses a regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the causal effect of credit scores on default, exploiting a rule that changes credit scores but not credit reports. To avoid penalizing consumers shopping for the best rate on a loan, credit scoring models count inquiries for major credit products, such as mortgages and auto loans, made within a short window of time as a single inquiry. The shopping window is 14 days in the VantageScore model whose scores we observe, and our empirical strategy compares consumers whose second inquiry falls just inside or just outside the window. The credit report lists both inquiries in either case, but the second inquiry lowers the score when it falls outside the window, and thus the comparison fully isolates the effect of the score

¹Approximately 62 percent of consumers with credit scores below 580 become seriously delinquent, defined as more than 90 days past due on a debt payment, compared with less than 1 percent of consumers with scores above 800 ([Experian, 2026a,b](#)).

from that of the underlying information. Using data from the Gies Consumer and Small Business Credit Panel (GCCP), a state-of-the-art credit panel covering between two and three million consumers per year, we observe roughly 700,000 pairs of major inquiries near the 14-day cutoff between 2021 and 2025.

The additional counted inquiry lowers credit scores by 5.1 points on average. As we would expect, this small decline in scores has no effect on new serious delinquency one or two years ahead among the most creditworthy consumers. However, for consumers in the major derogatory scorecard—those with a derogatory such as a collection, charge-off, or bankruptcy in their record—the additional inquiry lowers the score by 6.3 points and raises the probability of default by 1.1 percentage points after one year and by 3.2 percentage points after two years, with the latter effect being statistically significant.

We then measure what share of the relationship between credit scores and default is self-fulfilling for these consumers by scaling the causal effect of the score on default by the calibration slope, the cross-sectional relationship between scores and default. Our estimates imply that at least 13 percent of the predictive relationship between scores and default is self-fulfilling for consumers in the major derogatory scorecard. The data thus rule out the view that scores merely measure default risk for this group, and cannot rule out that the entire predictive relationship is self-fulfilling.

We find no evidence of manipulation of inquiry timing around the 14-day cutoff, and our placebo and falsification tests support the validity of the RD design. Consumers on either side of the boundary are indistinguishable on a wide range of predetermined characteristics, including their credit scores and delinquency histories before the inquiry. We also see no discontinuities in measures of credit-seeking behavior defined for the two inquiries that form the running variable, such as their loan types, whether they originate from distinct lenders, and whether both come from banks. Placebo cutoffs at 7 and 21 days—which mirror differences in the timing of applications but eliminate the difference in inquiry de-duplication—show no discontinuities, with confidence intervals that exclude our baseline estimates. Inquiry types that credit scoring models do not de-duplicate, such

as retail cards and utilities, also do not exhibit discontinuities at the cutoff. Consistent with the mechanism running through credit cards—which account for the vast majority of VantageScore uses among financial institutions—the additional counted inquiry reduces credit card accounts and limits but has no effect on mortgage or auto loans, for which VantageScore is rarely used.

We then ask whether a credit scorer would want to reduce self-fulfilling defaults by dampening adverse score movements. In a model of credit scoring with causal feedback, we show that the answer hinges on the scorer’s objective function. A scorer evaluated on the accuracy of its default probabilities can dampen adverse revisions in a way that both lowers default and improves accuracy—a strict Pareto improvement. However, a scorer evaluated on how well the score separates defaulters from non-defaulters cannot, because the score is rewarded for correctly ranking the very defaults it causes. In practice, credit scoring models are typically validated on separation metrics, suggesting that credit scoring companies have no incentive to limit the self-fulfilling defaults we document.

Our study contributes to a largely theoretical literature on the feedback effects of credit ratings, in which a rating affects the outcome it is designed to predict. Closest to our theory is [Manso \(2013\)](#), in which a downgrade raises the borrower’s probability of default, so a rating agency concerned with accuracy can rate leniently to account for the effects of its own ratings. Related work shows that ratings can select among equilibria ([Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits, 2006](#); [Holden, Natvik, and Vigier, 2018](#)), that rating agencies may optimally inflate ratings because of this feedback ([Goldstein and Huang, 2020](#)), and that more precise ratings can reduce efficiency by inducing the defaults they predict ([Terovitis, 2022](#)).² In consumer credit, [Garmaise and Natividad \(2017\)](#) show that a rating downgrade in Peru’s public credit registry reduces borrowing and increases repayment of loans in judicial collection, [Perdomo, Zrnic, Mendler-Dünner, and Hardt \(2020\)](#) study prediction

²A related empirical literature shows that corporate and municipal rating changes causally affect investment and financing (e.g., [Kisgen, 2006](#); [Sufi, 2009](#); [Tang, 2009](#); [Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012](#); [Adelino, Cunha, and Ferreira, 2017](#); [Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo, 2017](#); [Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Israelsen, 2018](#)). While not direct evidence of a rating-to-default feedback, this points to a mechanism through which ratings may cause future default in the corporate and municipal settings.

models whose deployment changes the outcomes they predict, and Chatterjee, Corbae, Dempsey, and Ríos-Rull (2023) develop an equilibrium model in which credit scores shape repayment incentives and are confirmed in equilibrium. The closest empirical evidence comes from Purnanandam and Wirth (2025), who estimate the effect of a pandemic-era suspension of delinquency reporting on subsequent default among borrowers of an online lending platform.

We make two contributions to this literature, one empirical and one theoretical. First, we estimate the causal effect of credit scores on future default, holding the contents of credit reports constant. We thus provide the first direct evidence of the score-to-default feedback effect that models in this literature often assume. Second, we show that the case for lenient ratings depends on the scorer’s objective function. Dampening adverse score movements improves forecast accuracy under proper scoring rules but not under the separation metrics used to validate credit scoring models in practice (Thomas, Crook, and Edelman, 2017), because separation metrics reward the score for the defaults it causes.

We also relate to research on the effects of credit-report information on consumer outcomes. Prior work has studied the removal of information about past bankruptcies, debt collections, delinquencies, and unpaid debts from credit reports, and its effects on credit access and financial health (e.g., Musto, 2004; Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang, 2020; Duarte, Fonseca, Kohli, and Reif, 2025), labor market outcomes (Bos, Breza, and Liberman, 2018; Dobbie, Goldsmith-Pinkham, Mahoney, and Song, 2020; Herkenhoff, Phillips, and Cohen-Cole, 2021), and aggregate credit and welfare (Liberman, Neilson, Opazo, and Zimmerman, 2018; Jansen, Nagel, Yannelis, and Zhang, 2025).³ These studies measure the total effect of removing information, which is the relevant object for credit reporting policy and combines the effect of credit scores with those of all direct uses of the credit report, including by lenders, employers, landlords, and insurers. In contrast, our research question—whether credit scores cause default—requires a change in credit scores holding

³Also related is Burke, Jamison, Karlan, Mihaly, and Zinman (2023), who find null average effects of credit builder loans on credit scores but heterogeneity by baseline credit activity. Their intervention combines the information effect of reporting a new loan with the effects of taking on the credit itself.

credit-report information fixed, and ours is the only instrument that we know of that provides such variation.

Finally, we relate to a growing literature on credit scoring. Prior studies have used machine learning to develop credit scoring models (e.g., Khandani, Kim, and Lo, 2010; Albanesi and Vamossy, 2019; Meursault, Moulton, Santucci, and Schor, 2022; Agarwal, Alok, Ghosh, and Gupta, 2023; Chioda, Gertler, Higgins, and Medina, 2024), studied disparities across borrowers (Blattner and Nelson, 2021; Fuster, Goldsmith-Pinkham, Ramadorai, and Walther, 2022), and evaluated the predictive content of credit-report information (Duarte, Fonseca, Kohli, and Reif, 2025). Like Fuster, Goldsmith-Pinkham, Ramadorai, and Walther (2022), we study the economic consequences of the scoring technology rather than its predictive performance. We show that the predictive performance of credit scores partly reflects the score’s own effect on default, implying that standard validation metrics overstate the information credit scoring models extract.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on the de-duplication of credit inquiries and describes the data. Section 3 presents the regression discontinuity design and the empirical results. Section 4 develops a model of credit scoring with causal feedback. Section 5 concludes.

2 Background and Data

2.1 Background: inquiry de-duplication in VantageScore

When a consumer applies for credit, the lender’s request for the credit report is recorded as a hard inquiry, and recent inquiries enter scoring models as a signal of new credit demand. Credit scoring models de-duplicate inquiries that arrive close together, so as not to treat consumers who are shopping around for a favorable rate as if they are seeking multiple loans (e.g., VantageScore, 2025). We focus on the de-duplication rule of the VantageScore model, which provides the credit scores we observe in our data. The model counts multiple major credit inquiries—such as mortgage, auto, installment, and bankcard—within a 14-

day window as one inquiry regardless of the type of major credit product, while retail, collection, and utility inquiries are not de-duped (VantageScore, 2022).

A consumer who applies for two loans 13 days apart and one who applies 15 days apart present the same information to lenders and other users of credit reports—two inquiries on the report—but the scoring model counts one inquiry for the first consumer and two for the second. Crossing the 14-day cutoff thus changes an input to the credit score but not the contents of the credit report. The public documentation is unclear about how inquiries exactly 14 days apart are treated, and whether their de-duplication depends on the difference in calendar dates or on the elapsed time between the inquiries. We observe the calendar dates of inquiries but not their times of day, so a 14-day gap can reflect an elapsed time just under or just over 14 days and can fall on either side of an elapsed-time window. Under either reading of the rule, gaps of 13 days or fewer fall within the window and gaps of 15 days or more fall outside it. As we discuss in Section 3, we therefore exclude inquiries with a 14-day gap from our estimation sample, following Dong and Kolesár (2023).

Although FICO remains the dominant credit scoring model, VantageScore’s market share has grown rapidly in recent years. VantageScore usage nearly doubled between 2021 and 2023, reaching 27 billion total uses and 12.9 billion uses among financial institutions (Courchane, Gailey, and Fronk, 2024), comparable to the 10 billion FICO scores purchased annually by lenders (FICO, 2025a). Credit card issuers are by far the heaviest users of VantageScore, accounting for 37% of all uses and 78% of uses by financial institutions (Appendix Figure A.1). This implies that the causal mechanism through which VantageScore credit scores affect default would likely run through lower access to credit cards, tightening liquidity and raising default risk. In Section 3.4, we provide evidence consistent with this channel.

FICO also de-duplicates inquiries, with the classic scores FICO 2, 4, and 5—which the government-sponsored enterprises required for conforming mortgage origination during our sample period (Fannie Mae, 2026)—following a 14-day rule and newer, more widely

used models de-duplicating over a 45-day window (FICO, 2025b; Experian, 2024).⁴ Unlike VantageScore, the FICO rule applies only to inquiries of the same type and covers only mortgage, auto, and student loans, with credit card inquiries never de-duplicated. This implies that it is possible that our estimate of the effect of credit scores on default reflects the effect of both VantageScore and older FICO models that de-duplicate at 14 days. As we discuss in Section 3, this would not materially change the interpretation of our reduced form estimates, which would still reflect the effect of credit scores on default, but would affect the interpretation of our scaled estimates if the effect of an additional inquiry differs meaningfully across models. However, we show in Section 3.3 that our estimates are driven by inquiry pairs that no FICO model de-duplicates and in Section 3.4 that the additional inquiry affects credit cards but not mortgage credit, both consistent with VantageScore and not older FICO models as the primary driver of the causal effect on default.

2.2 Data

Our data come from the Gies Consumer and Small Business Credit Panel (GCCP), a panel of anonymized credit records from one of the three major credit bureaus. The GCCP features a one-percent random sample of individuals with a credit report, with annual snapshots as of the end of the first quarter of each year from 2004 to 2025. Sampling is based on the last two digits of Social Security numbers, which accounts for natural flows into and out of the panel and keeps the sample representative of the population with a credit record over time. Each record includes all reported debt obligations, or tradelines, with balances, limits, and payment history; debts in collections; public records such as bankruptcies; the consumer’s credit score from the VantageScore model; and demographic variables such as age, sex, a bureau-provided income estimate, and zip code. We focus on inquiries from the post-pandemic 2021–2025 snapshots, which cover between 2.9 and 3.0 million consumers per year.

⁴Lenders were first permitted to use VantageScore 4.0 for mortgages sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in July 2025, after our final credit archive in March 2025.

Central to our design, the GCCP records individual hard inquiries with their exact dates, the type of credit sought, and the kind of business that pulled the report. In each year, we observe between 2.6 and 3.3 million inquiries for roughly one million consumers. We classify each inquiry by whether the de-duplication rule applies to it: mortgage, auto, installment, and bankcard inquiries are the “major” types the rule covers, while retail, utility, and collection inquiries are the types its documentation excludes. Major types account for 87 to 95 percent of inquiries, and the non-de-duplicated types are reserved for a placebo check (Section 3).

We construct the estimation sample as follows. We assign an inquiry to year t if it is dated in the 12 months ending at the year- t snapshot, that is, from April of year $t - 1$ through March of year t . For each consumer and year, we group major inquiries according to the de-duplication rule: the first inquiry opens a window, and subsequent inquiries within 14 days of the initial inquiry are de-duplicated. The first inquiry outside the initial 14-day window starts a new window. The running variable r_i is the number of days between a consumer’s initial inquiry and the next major inquiry, which can fall inside or outside the 14-day window. We take each consumer’s earliest spell with r_i between 6 and 22 days in a given year, yielding one observation per consumer-year, and require a valid credit score in both the year of the inquiry and the year before so that we can measure a change in scores. The resulting sample has 700,962 observations for major inquiries and 12,807 for the never-de-duplicated placebo types.

Our main outcome is new serious delinquency, measured as an indicator for any account reported 90 or more days past due during the 12 months ending at horizon $t + h$, for h equal to one or two years. This is the outcome definition and window that scoring models themselves are built to predict. Table 1 compares our estimation sample to the full GCCP. Consumers with multiple major inquiries in a short window are active credit seekers, and they are younger and riskier than the average consumer with a credit record. They have lower credit scores (654 versus 702 points), more newly opened accounts (1.8 versus 0.8 accounts), and their incidence of 90 days or more delinquency in the previous 12 months

is twice that of the full panel (0.4 versus 0.2 accounts). Our estimates are therefore local to this population, but it is a large one, accounting for about one in twenty consumers with a credit score in a given year, or roughly 14 million people nationwide.

Finally, we assign each consumer to one of three scorecards based on $t - 1$ information, mirroring the industry practice of scoring distinct segments with separate models. While the model in Section 4 has only two scorecards, for higher- and lower-risk consumers, we adopt the common practice of further separating consumers with thin files or short credit histories, as such files carry the noisiest scores and default predictions (Blattner and Nelson, 2021; Duarte, Fonseca, Kohli, and Reif, 2025), and we thus expect to be underpowered for this group. Our thin-young scorecard features consumers with fewer than three tradelines or whose oldest open account is less than 36 months old. Among the remainder, consumers with a prior major derogatory—a collection, a bankruptcy or other public record, or a charge-off on file—form the second scorecard, and consumers with clean files form the third. Appendix Table A.1 reports summary statistics by scorecard. Consumers in the major derogatory scorecard show the most financial distress, with 0.81 accounts 90 or more days past due on average, compared to 0.06 for clean files and 0.45 for thin and young files, whose credit histories are shortest and scores lowest.

3 Regression Discontinuity Design and Results

3.1 Empirical strategy

Our research design compares consumers whose second credit inquiry falls just outside the 14-day de-duplication window to consumers whose second inquiry falls just inside it. The running variable is r_i , the number of days between consumer i 's initial inquiry and the next inquiry, as described in Section 2.2. When the gap is 13 days or fewer, the scoring model counts the two inquiries as one; when it is 15 days or more, it counts them separately. As we discuss in Section 2.1, a gap of exactly 14 days is ambiguous under the rule's public description, which does not specify whether the window is inclusive and

whether it depends on the difference in calendar dates or on the elapsed time between the inquiries. If inquiries are de-duplicated based on elapsed time, the day gap we observe is a rounded version of the true running variable (Dong, 2015), and the 14-day cell contains both de-duplicated and counted inquiries. Dong and Kolesár (2023) show that the design nonetheless identifies a causal effect provided that the observed running variable correctly classifies treatment, after trimming observations at or in the immediate vicinity of the threshold where it does not. Our running variable classifies treatment correctly everywhere except at 14 days, and we thus exclude 14-day gaps from the estimation sample (Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell, 2016).

We estimate the following specification:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{ABOVE}_i + \gamma(r_i - 14) + \delta \text{ABOVE}_i \times (r_i - 14) + \varepsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where Y_i is the change in the consumer’s credit score from $t - 1$ to t or a delinquency outcome at horizon $t + h$, and ABOVE_i indicates $r_i > 14$. We estimate Equation (1) with a triangular kernel on observations within h days of the cutoff, excluding day 14. We demean outcomes by sample year to absorb cohort effects. The parameter β captures the effect of having the second inquiry counted separately.

We measure the effect of the credit score decline on default as the Wald ratio:

$$\tau_H = \frac{\beta^D}{-\beta^S}, \quad (2)$$

where β^S is the effect of the additional counted inquiry on credit scores (the first stage) and β^D the effect on delinquency (the reduced form), each the estimate of β from Equation (1). Because β^S is negative, τ_H measures the change in the probability of default, in percentage points, per one-point decline in the credit score, so a positive τ_H means that a decline in the score raises default.

The self-fulfilling share expresses this causal effect per unit of the default risk the score

itself predicts,

$$\phi = \frac{\tau_H}{m_H}, \quad (3)$$

where the calibration slope m_H is the predicted default risk that one score point carries at the in-bandwidth average score $\bar{S}$, measured as the slope of the fitted score-to-default curve. In the notation of the model in Section 4, $m_H = -\mu'_H(\bar{S})$, and ϕ is the causal feedback parameter the model takes as its empirical primitive.

The identifying assumption behind the RD is that assignment to either side of the cutoff is as good as random. We support this assumption with falsification tests on predetermined outcomes, with covariate smoothness tests, and by examining the distribution of the running variable around the cutoff. We interpret the effect of the additional counted inquiry on future default as the causal effect of the decline in scores, which requires the exclusion restriction that the counted inquiry affects default only through credit scores. This assumption is natural in our setting, as the de-duplication affects the credit score while leaving the underlying information unchanged, with the same two hard inquiries visible to lenders and other users of credit reports.⁵ We address concerns that a difference of a few days between the two inquiries can directly affect outcomes with placebo checks at 7 and 21 days, mirroring the difference between treatment and control consumers in the timing of applications but eliminating the difference in credit scores. These placebo checks show no discontinuities at the cutoff and are powered to reject our baseline estimates.

Recall from Section 2.1 that older FICO models (2, 4, and 5), which are primarily used for mortgage origination, also de-duplicate inquiries at the 14-day threshold, but only for pairs of same-type mortgage, auto, and student loan inquiries. This is not a violation of the exclusion restriction, as an effect of FICO scores on default would still run through credit scores, just not VantageScore credit scores. To the extent that the effect of an additional

⁵Credit reports are used in employment screening (Bartik and Nelson, 2025), tenant screening (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2022), and insurance pricing (Federal Trade Commission, 2007). Section 604 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act also permits debt collectors to obtain reports for collection purposes, and utility companies to obtain them when a consumer initiates service, which they use to set security deposits or deny service (Federal Trade Commission, 2025).

inquiry on FICO differs from the first-stage effect we estimate using VantageScore scores, this would affect the scaled estimate in Equation (2) and, consequently, the self-fulfilling share in Equation (3). However, two sets of results indicate that VantageScore, and not older FICO models, is the main driver of the causal effect on default. First, our estimates are driven by the sample of inquiry pairs that no FICO model de-duplicates, for which crossing the 14-day threshold only moves VantageScore scores (Section 3.3). Second, the additional inquiry affects credit cards, which account for most uses of VantageScore among lenders, but not mortgage credit, where older FICO models are used (Section 3.4).

Standard errors are clustered at the consumer level. Since the running variable is discrete, we follow Kolesár and Rothe (2018) and report fixed-length confidence intervals (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2018) that account for the worst-case bias of the local linear estimator over a Hölder smoothness class, with a side-specific curvature bound as in Armstrong and Kolesár (2020). We select the bound using their rule of thumb, which fits a global quartic polynomial to the outcome on each side of the cutoff and takes the largest curvature of the fitted polynomial. These intervals are honest in the sense of Li (1989), meaning that they achieve correct coverage uniformly over all conditional expectation functions in the class, and are appropriate when the running variable is measured with error (Dong and Kolesár, 2023). For the Wald ratio of Equation (2), we report the bias-aware confidence intervals of Noack and Rothe (2024), which test candidate values of the ratio directly rather than relying on delta-method approximations. Because they guard against the worst-case bias allowed by the smoothness class, these confidence intervals are wider than the robust bias-corrected intervals typically used in RD designs with continuous running variables (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 2014), so our inference is conservative relative to standard practice. The optimal bandwidth is the one that minimizes the length of the honest confidence interval (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020) and is allowed to vary by outcome.

3.2 Results

We start by estimating the effect of the additional counted inquiry on credit scores. Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the effect in the full sample, where the marginal counted inquiry lowers credit scores by 5.1 points (column 1 of Table 2). The magnitude matches public documentation regarding the impact of inquiries on credit scores, which puts the effect of a single additional inquiry at five to ten points (Experian, 2024). Table 2 shows that the decline in scores is present in every scorecard: 6.3 points for borrowers with prior major derogatories (also shown in panel (b) of Figure 1), 6.7 for clean files, and a weaker 3.0 for thin and young files. As we expected, we are underpowered in the thin-young scorecard, where the first stage F-statistic is 5.8, compared to 22.7 and 46.3 in the major derogatory and clean file scorecards, respectively.

The modest decline in credit scores does not increase default rates for the average consumer. At the one-year horizon, the effect on new serious delinquency is 0.10 percentage points (column 1 of Appendix Table A.2), and at the two-year horizon it is 0.16 percentage points (column 1 of Table 3). Panel (a) of Figure 2 makes this point visually, showing no evidence of a discontinuity in $t + 2$ default for the full sample.

However, the average effect masks considerable heterogeneity, with consumers with prior histories of serious default being more responsive to the credit-score shock. For the major derogatory scorecard, the two-year effect on default is 3.19 percentage points (column 2 of Table 3)—building from a statistically insignificant increase of 1.07 percentage points after one year (Table A.2)—and is visible as a discontinuity in panel (b) of Figure 2. We find no effect in the other two scorecards (column 3–4 of Table 3), though the weaker score response in the thin-young segment limits what our design can say about these borrowers.

Next, we estimate what share of the predictive relationship between scores and default are self-fulfilling in the major derogatory scorecard, according to Equation (3). We collect the inputs into this share in Table 4. For the major derogatory scorecard, the Wald ratio of Equation (2) is $\tau_H = 0.50$ percentage points of additional default per point of score decline, and the calibration slope at the in-bandwidth average score of $\bar{S} = 610$ is

$m_H = 0.465$ percentage points of predicted default per point (Appendix Figure A.10). The resulting point estimate for the self-fulfilling share is thus $\phi = 1.08$, implying that, at the margin we identify, roughly all of the score’s predictive slope for borrowers in the major derogatory scorecard is self-fulfilling (Table 4).

Our confidence intervals for the self-fulfilling share are wide, and we are thus underpowered to pin down the exact magnitude of this effect. We report the confidence interval from a clustered bootstrap that resamples consumers and re-estimates every input to the ratio in each of 1,000 draws, which suggests that the self-fulfilling share is at least 32 percent (Table 4). This confidence interval reflects only sampling uncertainty, and thus we also report a Noack and Rothe (2024) bias-aware confidence interval. This worst-case bias interval also excludes zero, so even the most conservative reading of our estimates implies that at least 13 percent (or roughly one eighth) of the score’s predictive content for these borrowers reflects defaults caused by the score itself. The results in Section 4 depend only on the share being bounded away from zero and not on its magnitude, and thus these findings provide the empirical primitive that our model takes as input.

3.3 Robustness

We evaluate the no-manipulation assumption by testing whether predetermined outcomes are continuous at the cutoff. Figure A.2 shows no statistically significant discontinuities in income, age, or sex, measured in $t - 1$. Figure A.3 goes further by assessing measures of credit-seeking behavior defined for the two inquiries that form the running variable. Because the decline in credit scores happens only after the inquiry is recorded, these outcomes are upstream of the shock despite being measured contemporaneously. We find no discontinuities in the number of distinct lenders behind the two inquiries, measured as unique combinations of industry and subscriber codes, or in whether both inquiries come from banks. We also see no discontinuity in whether the two inquiries are of the same major type (e.g., for a mortgage loan, an auto loan, or a bankcard), indicating that rate-shopping versus seeking-multiple-loans behavior does not change at the cutoff.

We also examine the distribution of the running variable. Because the running variable is discrete, the standard McCrary (2008) test, which estimates the density of a continuous running variable on each side of the cutoff, does not apply, and we instead examine the distribution of day gaps directly (Frandsen, 2017) in Appendix Figure A.4. The distribution bunches at weekly multiples of 7, 14, 21, and 28 days, reflecting the day-of-week rhythm of credit applications, and the excess mass at day 14 is statistically indistinguishable from the excess mass at the weekly days the scoring rule attaches no meaning to. The standard response to bunching of this kind is a donut specification that drops observations at the cutoff (Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell, 2016), which we already do because we cannot correctly classify treatment for inquiries with a 14-day gap (Section 2.1).

We also conduct a series of falsification and placebo tests. Appendix Figures A.5 and A.6 replicate our RD specification using predetermined outcomes, including credit scores, balances, delinquencies, collections, bankruptcies, and past inquiries, all measured at $t - 1$. As expected, we find no evidence of discontinuities. Appendix Figures A.7 and A.8 reproduce our RD at placebo cutoffs of 7 and 21 days, respectively. In these specifications, the difference in the timing of applications mirrors that of our design, but there are no differences in inquiry de-duplication across treatment and control groups, thus addressing concerns that a difference of a few days between inquiries can directly affect outcomes. Honest confidence intervals across both placebo cutoffs exclude our statistically significant estimates, including $t + 2$ delinquency for the major derogatory scorecard (column 4, Appendix Tables A.5 and A.6). Finally, Appendix Figure A.9 repeats our analysis for retail, utility, and collection inquiries, which the scoring model does not de-duplicate, and likewise finds no statistically significant effects on credit scores or subsequent delinquency, though the small sample of never-de-duplicated inquiries makes these confidence intervals wide. Together, these results show that the 14-day cutoff is not associated with breaks in predetermined outcomes, at cutoffs not associated with de-duplication, or in inquiry types the rule does not de-duplicate, supporting the validity of our RD design.

Finally, we also address the overlap with the de-duplication rule in older FICO models. As we discuss in Section 2.1, FICO de-duplicates only mortgage, auto, and student loan inquiries, and only when both inquiries are for the same product type (for instance, two mortgage inquiries). Therefore, inquiry pairs involving a credit card inquiry or two different types of credit, which constitute 58 percent of our estimation sample, are de-duplicated by VantageScore and not FICO. Panel A of Appendix Table A.8 replicates our analysis for these pairs that FICO does not de-duplicate. The additional counted inquiry lowers credit scores by 5.1 points overall, and lowers scores by 6.7 points and raises $t + 2$ delinquency in the major derogatory scorecard by 3.7 percentage points, indistinguishable from our baseline estimates. For same-type mortgage, auto, and student loan pairs, for which the additional inquiry also moves the classic FICO scores, we find no statistically significant effect on delinquency in the major derogatory scorecard, though with wide confidence intervals that include our baseline estimate (Panel B). This implies that our estimates are not driven by inquiry pairs de-duplicated by FICO and, if anything, are stronger where only VantageScore de-duplicates.

3.4 Mechanism

To further support a causal interpretation of our findings, we provide evidence for the likely mechanism through which lower credit scores increase the risk of default. As we discuss in Section 2.1, credit card issuers account for 78% of uses of VantageScore credit scores among financial institutions, making access to credit cards the natural mechanism through which lower VantageScore scores can worsen the borrower’s financial position. Older FICO models, which also de-duplicate at the 14-day threshold, are primarily used in mortgage origination and not credit cards.

Appendix Table A.9 reports the effect of the additional counted inquiry on three credit card outcomes measured at $t + 1$, after the decline in scores at t but before the increase in default rates at $t + 2$. The additional counted inquiry leads to fewer credit card accounts (Panel A), lower credit card limits (Panel B), and, to a lesser extent, lower credit card

balances (Panel C). In the full sample, the additional counted inquiry reduces new card accounts by 0.04 and credit card limits by \$959, statistically significant at 10% and 5%, respectively. The effects are concentrated among the major derogatory and clean file scorecards, and we cannot reject that these two groups experience the same reduction in credit card access. This pattern mirrors the first stage, where both scorecards experience similar declines in credit scores (Table 2), suggesting that the same shock has very different consequences for default across different consumers. Borrowers in the major derogatory scorecard, who have ex ante lower scores, less available credit, and a history of financial distress, are the ones for whom lower access to credit cards translates into higher default rates (Table 3).

Finally, as a placebo test, we check whether the decline in credit scores reduces access to credit products for which usage of VantageScore credit scores is negligible. Specifically, mortgage and auto lenders account for less than 2% of VantageScore uses (Appendix Figure A.1), suggesting that our instrument should not affect mortgage and auto loans. Appendix Table A.10 reports the effect of the additional counted inquiry on mortgage and auto outcomes, focusing on new accounts and balances as there is no straightforward definition of limits for installment loans. Across all panels, we find no statistically significant effects even at the 10% level, and confidence intervals for both new account variables (Panels A and C) exclude the estimated decline in credit card accounts for the full sample and for the clean and major derogatory scorecards (Appendix Table A.9, Panel A). Overall, these results are consistent with the decline in VantageScore credit scores causing higher default rates for ex ante riskier borrowers by tightening the liquidity provided by credit cards. In line with our evidence that VantageScore, and not older FICO models, is the primary driver of the effect on default (Appendix Table A.8), we do not see effects on mortgage origination, for which older FICO models are used.

4 A Model of Credit Scoring

Our estimates imply that, for borrowers with prior derogatories, a lower credit score causes part of the default it predicts. This section develops a parsimonious model of what this causal feedback implies for the credit scorer. The model treats the causal effect of scores on default as an empirical primitive—the parameter ϕ we estimate in Section 3—and asks whether a scorer who could dampen adverse score movements would want to.

We show that the answer hinges entirely on the scorer’s objective function. If the scorer evaluates the score as a numerical default-probability forecast, dampening adverse revisions can be a strict Pareto improvement, lowering default and improving measured forecast accuracy. If the scorer instead evaluates how well the score orders borrowers by realized default, no such improvement exists. Because the score causes defaults among borrowers it already ranks as risky, the score is rewarded for correctly ranking defaults it helped create.

4.1 Environment

There are two periods. In period 1, borrower i has credit-report state x_i , which summarizes the information available to scoring models, such as payment history, balances, utilization, account age, recent inquiries, and public records. Default $Y_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is realized in period 2. Borrowers belong to one of two observed types, $T_i \in \{H, L\}$. The credit scorer observes (x_i, T_i) but is naive about the causal effect of scores on default. It learns equilibrium default probabilities under the status quo score and does not internalize that the score partly generates those defaults.

The naive credit score is $s_i^N = s^N(x_i, T_i) \in \mathcal{S}_T$, where higher scores indicate lower predicted default risk. The score is associated with a type-specific probability scale $\mu_T : \mathcal{S}_T \rightarrow (0, 1)$, continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing, so that $\mu_T(s)$ is the default probability forecast encoded by score s for type T . We write $p_i^N = \mu_{T_i}(s_i^N)$ for the status quo forecast.

Let $a_i \geq 0$ denote an adverse revision to the naive score, measured on the probability scale: a_i is the increase in the default-probability forecast implied by the naive rule's downward revision of borrower i 's score, with $a_i = 0$ for borrowers whose score is not revised downward. Adverse revisions occur in the affected segment,

$$\mathbb{E}_H[a_i] > 0, \quad (4)$$

where $\mathbb{E}_H[\cdot]$ denotes expectation conditional on $T_i = H$.

We consider whether the scorer has an incentive to smooth adverse revisions to credit scores. A smoothing rule with parameter $\lambda_T \in [0, 1]$ replaces the naive forecast with

$$p_i(\lambda_T) = p_i^N - \lambda_T a_i, \quad (5)$$

reported as the credit score $s_i(\lambda_T) = \mu_{T_i}^{-1}(p_i(\lambda_T)) \geq s_i^N$. Setting $\lambda_T = 0$ reproduces the naive score, while $\lambda_T = 1$ fully removes the adverse revision. To match our empirical design, which identifies the effect of adverse score movements and has no corresponding positive score shock, we assume that score improvements have no effect on defaults and are not dampened.

Under the status quo rule, the naive score is calibrated to the equilibrium conditional mean:

$$\mathbb{P}(Y_i = 1 \mid x_i, T_i, \lambda_T = 0) = p_i^N. \quad (6)$$

Calibration does not mean the naive score is structurally correct, only that it is correct for the default distribution generated by its own deployment.

Motivated by our empirical findings, we assume scores have no causal effect on default for type L . For type H , credit score declines raise future default, so smoothing those declines lowers default relative to the no-smoothing counterfactual.

Let $\phi > 0$ denote the causal feedback parameter, the reduction in the true default probability per unit reduction in the forecast induced by smoothing. For an H borrower, under

smoothing $\lambda \equiv \lambda_H$,

$$q_i(\lambda) \equiv \mathbb{P}(Y_i = 1 \mid x_i, T_i = H, \lambda) = p_i^N - \phi \lambda a_i, \quad (7)$$

while for an L borrower $\mathbb{P}(Y_i = 1 \mid x_i, T_i = L, \lambda_L) = p_i^N$. We assume throughout that $p_i(\lambda_T)$ remains in the range of μ_{T_i} and that $q_i(\lambda_T) \in [0, 1]$ for all $\lambda_T \in [0, 1]$. Because borrower type is observed and there is no causal feedback for L borrowers, the scorer sets $\lambda_L = 0$, and we focus on $\lambda \equiv \lambda_H$. The expected default rate of H borrowers is $D_H(\lambda) = \mathbb{E}_H[q_i(\lambda)]$. Borrowers incur a utility cost when they default, so borrower welfare is ordered by $D_H(\lambda)$.

The credit scorer's objective. The scorer evaluates a scoring rule through an objective $\mathcal{O}(\lambda) = \mathcal{O}(\{s_i(\lambda)\}, \{q_i(\lambda)\})$. A smoothing rule is a Pareto improvement over the naive rule if it weakly improves the scorer's objective and strictly lowers expected borrower default costs. For objectives written as losses, lower values are better; for objectives written as performance metrics, higher values are better. Our results hinge on the scorer's objective, and we consider two classes of objectives in turn.

4.2 Case 1: The objective is probability-forecast accuracy

The first class of objectives evaluates the numerical probability forecast encoded by the score. Metrics in this class depend on the levels of the predicted probabilities and not only on how they rank borrowers, rewarding a score whose borrowers default at rates compatible with its predictions.

Definition 1 (Probability-forecast loss). *A binary probability-forecast loss is a function $\ell : (0, 1) \times \{0, 1\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. If a borrower defaults with probability q and the score reports default probability p , the expected loss is*

$$L(p, q) = q\ell(p, 1) + (1 - q)\ell(p, 0). \quad (8)$$

The loss is standard on a set $\mathcal{P} \subset (0, 1)$ if L is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of $\{(p, p) : p \in \mathcal{P}\}$ and satisfies two conditions. First, it is locally proper: for every $q \in \mathcal{P}$, the expected loss $p \mapsto L(p, q)$ attains a local minimum at $p = q$, so that

$$L_p(p, p) = 0 \quad \text{for all } p \in \mathcal{P}. \quad (9)$$

Second, defaults are the more costly forecast error:

$$L_q(p, p) = \ell(p, 1) - \ell(p, 0) > 0 \quad \text{for all } p \in \mathcal{P}. \quad (10)$$

Lower expected loss represents better measured probability-forecast accuracy.

Local propriety says that, holding the outcome distribution fixed, reporting the true default probability is locally optimal. It holds for any proper scoring rule that is differentiable in the forecast. Condition (10) says that a realized default is the worse outcome for measured accuracy. At any forecast in $\mathcal{P}$, the loss recorded when a borrower defaults exceeds the loss recorded when that borrower repays, so fewer defaults improve the measured accuracy of a given forecast. The two conditions are linked through the generalized entropy of the loss, $G(p) = L(p, p)$: local propriety gives $G'(p) = L_q(p, p)$, so condition (10) requires the entropy to be strictly increasing on $\mathcal{P}$.

For a probability-forecast loss, the credit scorer's objective is $\mathcal{L}_H(\lambda) = \mathbb{E}_H[L(p_i(\lambda), q_i(\lambda))]$, where lower values are better. Our first theorem shows that if the self-fulfilling share is greater than zero ($\phi > 0$), a strict Pareto improvement exists under this objective.

Theorem 1 (Probability-forecast loss). *Suppose the population of H borrowers is finite and the credit scorer evaluates scores using a probability-forecast loss that is standard on a set $\mathcal{P}$ in the sense of Definition 1. Suppose $\phi > 0$ and*

$$p_i^N \in \mathcal{P} \quad \text{for every } H \text{ borrower with } a_i > 0. \quad (11)$$

Then, with $\lambda_L = 0$, there exists $\bar{\lambda} \in (0, 1]$ such that every $\lambda \in (0, \bar{\lambda}]$ satisfies

$$D_H(\lambda) < D_H(0) \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{L}_H(\lambda) < \mathcal{L}_H(0). \quad (12)$$

Under a probability-forecast loss, a small amount of smoothing is therefore a Pareto improvement, strictly lowering default for H borrowers and strictly improving the credit scorer's measured forecast accuracy.

The proof, in Appendix B.1, is an envelope argument. At a calibrated score, the forecast is locally optimal, so the accuracy cost of reporting a slightly more optimistic forecast is second order. The gain is first order, because smoothing impacts defaults. With $\phi > 0$, the true default probability of smoothed borrowers falls, and when defaults are the more costly forecast error, fewer defaults mean lower measured loss.

4.3 Case 2: The objective is rank-separation

The second class of objectives evaluates how well the score orders borrowers by realized default status. These objectives do not require the numerical score to be a correct default probability, but rather reward the separation between the score ranks of realized defaulters and non-defaulters. Examples of rank-separation metrics include the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUC) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS).

Throughout, the metric is computed within the affected segment H . For a smoothing rule λ , let

$$F_1^\lambda(s) = \mathbb{P}(s_i^N \leq s \mid Y_i = 1, T_i = H; \lambda), \quad F_0^\lambda(s) = \mathbb{P}(s_i^N \leq s \mid Y_i = 0, T_i = H; \lambda) \quad (13)$$

be the score-rank distributions among realized defaulters and non-defaulters in the H population. A better ranking has defaulters shifted to lower scores and non-defaulters shifted to higher scores.

Definition 2 (Rank-separation metric). *A metric $\mathfrak{R}(F_1, F_0)$ is a rank-separation metric*

if it depends on scores only through their ranks—it is invariant to strictly increasing transformations of the score applied to both distributions—and it is weakly increasing in score-rank separation: whenever

$$\tilde{F}_1(s) \geq F_1(s) \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{F}_0(s) \leq F_0(s) \quad \text{for all } s, \quad (14)$$

then $\mathfrak{R}(\tilde{F}_1, \tilde{F}_0) \geq \mathfrak{R}(F_1, F_0)$.

The first input into our second theoretical result is that small smoothing preserves the ranking. Because smoothing is proportional to each borrower’s adverse revision a_i , the reported score $s_i(\lambda)$ need not be a monotone transformation of s_i^N at every λ : a borrower with a large adverse revision can overtake one with a small revision once λ is large enough. Lemma 1 shows that this cannot happen below an explicit threshold.

Lemma 1 (Rank preservation under small smoothing). *Suppose the population of H borrowers is finite with distinct naive scores. Define*

$$\bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}} = \min \left\{ \frac{p_i^N - p_j^N}{a_i - a_j} : p_i^N > p_j^N \text{ and } a_i > a_j \right\}, \quad (15)$$

with $\bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}} = +\infty$ when no such pair of borrowers exists. Then $\bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}} > 0$, and for every $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ with $\lambda < \bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}}$ the smoothed score is a strictly increasing transformation of the naive score: $s_i(\lambda) = \varphi_\lambda(s_i^N)$ for some strictly increasing φ_λ , so the ranking of borrowers by score is unchanged.

The proof is in Appendix B.2. Smoothing moves a pair of borrowers together only when the difference in adverse revisions outruns the difference in naive forecasts, and $\bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}}$ is the smoothing weight at which the closest such pair first ties. Below it, no pair ties or reverses.

The second input into our second theoretical result is the assumption that the causal feedback from scores is rank-aligned, formalized as Assumption 1.

Assumption 1 (Rank-aligned causal feedback). *Let F_C be the score distribution of the*

marginal score-induced defaults:

$$F_C(s) = \frac{\mathbb{E}_H[a_i \mathbf{1}\{s_i^N \leq s\}]}{\mathbb{E}_H[a_i]}. \quad (16)$$

The marginal score-induced defaults are concentrated at lower scores than the realized default and non-default distributions under the naive rule:

$$F_C(s) \geq F_1^0(s) \quad \text{and} \quad F_C(s) \geq F_0^0(s) \quad \text{for all } s. \quad (17)$$

Assumption 1 says that the defaults the score creates arise among borrowers the score already ranks as high risk. Under the status quo calibration, realized defaulters are already concentrated at low scores, so (17) requires adverse revisions to be concentrated at low scores even more heavily than defaults themselves. Whether feedback is rank-aligned is an empirical question, and we show evidence that this assumption holds in our setting in Appendix Figure A.11. The figure plots the risk-rank distribution of adverse score revisions in the major derogatory scorecard (our empirical proxy for H) against the distributions of realized defaulters and non-defaulters. The revision-weighted distribution lies to the right of both at every point, so the score-induced marginal defaults sit among borrowers the score already ranks riskiest, as required by Assumption 1.

Our second theorem shows that if the self-fulfilling share is greater than zero ($\phi > 0$) and the causal effect on default is rank-aligned, smoothing cannot improve the rank-separation objective.

Theorem 2 (Rank-separation metric). *Suppose the population of H borrowers is finite with distinct naive scores, $\phi > 0$, and Assumption 1 holds. Let $\bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}} > 0$ be the rank-preservation threshold of Lemma 1, and let the credit scorer's objective be a rank-separation metric $\mathfrak{R}(F_1^\lambda, F_0^\lambda)$ in the sense of Definition 2, computed within the H segment. Then, with $\lambda_L = 0$, every $\lambda \in (0, 1]$ with $\lambda < \bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}}$ and $D_H(\lambda) > 0$ satisfies*

$$D_H(\lambda) < D_H(0) \quad \text{but} \quad \mathfrak{R}(F_1^\lambda, F_0^\lambda) \leq \mathfrak{R}(F_1^0, F_0^0) : \quad (18)$$

smoothing strictly lowers default but cannot improve the rank-separation objective.

The proof, in Appendix B.3, works through the realized default distribution. Smoothing removes default mass from each borrower in proportion to the adverse revision a_i , so the removed mass is distributed across scores according to F_C . Under Assumption 1, that mass sits at the bottom of the ranking, so its removal shifts the remaining defaulters toward safer scores and the non-defaulters toward riskier scores, weakly compressing rank separation. In other words, rank-separation metrics reward the score for the defaults it causes.

Note that Theorem 2 still allows a Pareto improvement if smoothing leaves the rank-separation objective exactly unchanged. The theorem cannot rule this case out for the general class of rank-separation metrics because smoothing compresses separation at specific scores, and a metric can be exactly unchanged if it puts no weight on those scores. For instance, KS measures only the largest gap between the two distributions, so it does not move when compression occurs at other scores. Corollary 1 rules out a Pareto improvement for commonly used separation metrics, giving conditions under which AUC, KS, and top-group recall and lift strictly decline with smoothing.

Corollary 1 (Common separation metrics). *Under the conditions of Theorem 2, each of AUC, KS, recall-at-top- p , and top- p lift strictly falls for any $\lambda \in (0, 1]$ with $\lambda < \bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}}$ and $D_H(\lambda) > 0$, provided the corresponding strictness condition holds: for AUC, $F_C > F_1^0$ on a set of scores with positive non-defaulter mass under the naive rule, or $F_C > F_0^0$ on a set with positive defaulter mass under the naive rule; for KS, $\sup_s [F_1^0(s) - F_0^0(s)] > 0$, which holds unless all H borrowers share a single naive score; for recall and lift, $F_C(s_p) > F_1^0(s_p)$ at the top-group cutoff s_p . In each case, smoothing strictly lowers default and strictly lowers the metric, so no positive smoothing rule below the rank-preservation threshold is a Pareto improvement under these objectives.*

Appendix B.4 shows that AUC and KS are rank-separation metrics in the sense of Definition 2. Recall-at-top- p and top- p lift are not functionals of (F_1, F_0) alone, as their cutoff depends on the population score distribution and hence on the default rate, but

Lemma 2 shows that smoothing leaves the population score distribution unchanged, so along the smoothing path both reduce to monotone functionals of F_1 at a fixed cutoff and the corollary covers them directly. Appendix B.5 proves the corollary. Precision-at-top- p lies outside Definition 2 because it depends on the default rate as well as the ranks, but it also falls with smoothing (Appendix B.6).

4.4 Discussion

In the empirics of Section 3, we estimate the self-fulfilling share ϕ for borrowers in the major derogatory scorecard—for whom adverse score shocks cause default—and bound this share away from zero with 95 percent confidence. We also provide further evidence that this effect is concentrated among borrowers that the scoring model already ranks as high risk (Assumption 1) in Appendix Figure A.11. Under these empirically supported assumptions, our theoretical results say that whether this causal feedback is something the credit scorer would want to limit depends on the objective. A scorer targeting forecast accuracy would want to smooth adverse revisions when defaults are the more costly forecast error (Theorem 1). In contrast, a scorer targeting rank separation would not want to smooth, because the causal effect is concentrated on borrowers that the score thinks will default, and thus the score is rewarded for the defaults it causes (Theorem 2).

In practice, credit scoring models are typically evaluated on separation metrics (Thomas, Crook, and Edelman, 2017). Credit scoring companies themselves describe models as enabling lenders “to rank consumers by their potential risk” and note that scores are “not designed for predicting absolute default rates” (VantageScore, 2022). Our results thus suggest that scorers have no incentive to reduce self-fulfilling defaults.

This conclusion relies on Theorem 2, which covers only smoothing parameters that are small enough to satisfy the rank-preservation threshold of Lemma 1. We view small smoothing as the empirically relevant case, as a scorer considering implementing a dampening rule would likely begin with modest departures from its current model. However, the data allow us to evaluate large interventions by extrapolating our local empirical es-

timate. We do so by tracing the two most common rank-separation metrics, AUC and KS, along the entire smoothing path implied by our estimates. For every consumer in the major derogatory scorecard we form the smoothed forecast $p_i(\lambda) = r_i^N - \lambda a_i$ and the counterfactual default probability $q_i(\lambda) = r_i^N - \hat{\phi} \lambda a_i$, where r_i^N , the empirical counterpart of the naive forecast p_i^N , and a_i are constructed from the calibration curve as in Appendix Figure A.11 and $\hat{\phi}$ is the self-fulfilling share estimated in Section 3. We then compute AUC and KS at each possible value of the smoothing weight.

Appendix Figure A.12 reports results of this exercise. Panels (a) and (b) show AUC and KS, respectively, at the point estimate of $\phi = 1.08$ (Table 4), both within the major derogatory scorecard and pooled across all scorecards. Panels (c) and (d) repeat the within-scorecard paths with ϕ at the bounds of the honest confidence interval. Across all versions of this exercise, every path lies strictly below its no-smoothing value at every positive value of the smoothing weight λ . In the data, our estimates thus imply that any amount of smoothing strictly lowers common rank-separation metrics, supporting the conclusion that scorers would have no incentive to curb the self-fulfilling defaults we document.

5 Conclusion

This paper asks whether credit scores cause some of the defaults they predict. Our regression discontinuity design exploits the de-duplication of credit inquiries, which moves credit scores while leaving credit reports unchanged. Among consumers with prior derogatories, scores fall by over six points and new serious delinquency rises by 3.2 percentage points after two years. Our estimates imply that at least 13 percent of the relationship between scores and default is self-fulfilling for these consumers.

In a model of credit scoring with causal feedback, we then show that a scorer evaluated on forecast accuracy would want to dampen adverse score movements, lowering default and improving measured accuracy at the same time. However, a scorer evaluated on separating defaulters from non-defaulters would not, because separation metrics reward the score

for the defaults it causes. In practice, credit scoring models are typically validated on separation metrics, suggesting that scorers have no incentive to curb the self-fulfilling defaults we document.

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
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
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Figure 1: Effect of an Additional Counted Inquiry on Credit Scores




(a) Full sample




(b) Prior major derogatories

Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the running variable and the change in credit scores from $t - 1$ to t . The running variable is the number of days between a consumer's initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. Panel (a) shows the full sample and Panel (b) the major derogatory scorecard. The corresponding RD estimates from Equation (1) are reported in Table 2.

Figure 2: Effect of an Additional Counted Inquiry on $t + 2$ Delinquency



(a) Full sample



(b) Prior major derogatories

Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the running variable and the share of consumers with any account reported 90 or more days past due during the 12 months ending at $t + 2$. The running variable is the number of days between a consumer's initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. Panel (a) shows the full sample and Panel (b) the major derogatory scorecard. The corresponding RD estimates from Equation (1) are reported in Table 3.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	GCCP			Active Credit Seekers		
	Mean	St. Dev.	Median	Mean	St. Dev.	Median
A. Demographics						
Income (\$1,000)	51.59	32.92	41.00	52.71	34.30	41.00
Age (years)	50.87	19.65	50.00	42.17	14.35	40.00
Female (%)	49.82	50.00	0.00	47.70	49.95	0.00
B. Access to Credit						
Credit Score	701.90	99.48	714.00	653.55	100.30	647.00
Total Balance (\$1,000)	79.92	195.93	8.63	108.99	237.72	24.29
Credit Card Balance (\$1,000)	4.29	9.37	0.75	5.36	10.72	1.25
Credit Card Limit (\$1,000)	23.37	33.84	10.00	21.66	35.98	5.75
Number of Accounts	10.53	9.78	8.00	14.84	12.55	12.00
New Inquiries in Last 12 Months	1.20	2.51	0.00	3.99	5.30	2.00
New Accounts in Last 12 Months	0.76	1.29	0.00	1.76	2.11	1.00
New Credit Card Accounts in Last 12 Months	0.42	0.90	0.00	0.99	1.52	0.00
C. Financial Distress						
Number of Accounts 90+ Days Past Due	0.17	0.85	0.00	0.40	1.30	0.00
Balance 90+ Days Past Due (\$1,000)	0.73	11.48	0.00	1.24	13.04	0.00
Number of Collections	0.55	1.75	0.00	1.23	2.53	0.00
Bankruptcy (%)	2.61	15.93	0.00	6.69	24.98	0.00
Observations	13,527,988			700,962		

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the full GCCP and for our estimation sample of active credit seekers, consumers with at least two major inquiries within 6 to 22 days (Section 2.2). All variables are measured at $t - 1$, the year before the inquiries.

Table 2: Effect of an Additional Counted Inquiry on Credit Scores

	Full sample	Major derogatory	Clean file	Thin-young
ABOVE	-5.13*** [-7.03, -3.23]	-6.33*** [-9.32, -3.34]	-6.72*** [-9.12, -4.31]	-2.96** [-5.78, -0.14]
Control Mean	654	614	740	601
Optimal Bandwidth	± 3	± 3	± 3	± 3
F -statistic	55.9	22.7	46.3	5.8
Observations				
Total	700,962	175,250	249,655	276,057
In-Bandwidth	221,893	55,988	78,469	87,436

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficient β and honest 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (1), where the outcome is the change in credit scores from $t - 1$ to t , in points. The running variable is the number of days between a consumer’s initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. Columns split the sample by the scorecards defined in Section 2. We report honest confidence intervals in brackets, which account for the worst-case bias of the local linear estimator (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). Control Mean reports the mean score at $t - 1$ on the control side of the bandwidth. The reported optimal bandwidth minimizes the length of the honest confidence interval. “In-Bandwidth” observations report the number of observations falling within this window, while “Total” observations report the full estimation sample. A */**/** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on honest confidence intervals.

Table 3: Effect of an Additional Counted Inquiry on $t + 2$ Delinquency

	Full sample	Major derogatory	Clean file	Thin-young
ABOVE	0.16 [-1.68, 2.00]	3.19** [0.37, 6.01]	-0.39 [-2.37, 1.58]	-1.26 [-3.73, 1.21]
Control Mean	27.52	36.88	11.09	36.34
Optimal Bandwidth	± 4	± 4	± 4	± 4
Observations				
Total	451,475	113,490	160,065	177,920
In-Bandwidth	190,234	48,358	66,664	75,212

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficient β and honest 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (1), where the outcome is an indicator equal to 100 if the consumer has any account reported 90 or more days past due during the 12 months ending at $t + 2$. The running variable is the number of days between a consumer’s initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. Columns split the sample by the scorecards defined in Section 2. We report honest confidence intervals in brackets (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). Control Mean reports the mean of the dependent variable on the control side of the bandwidth. The reported optimal bandwidth minimizes the length of the honest confidence interval. “In-Bandwidth” observations report the number of observations falling within this window, while “Total” observations report the full estimation sample. A */**/** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on honest confidence intervals.

Table 4: The Self-Fulfilling Share ϕ : Inputs and Estimates

	Estimate	95% CI
Reduced form on default, $t + 2$ (p.p.)	3.19	[0.37, 6.01]
First stage on credit score (points)	-6.33	[-9.32, -3.34]
τ_H (p.p. per point)	0.50	[0.06, 1.99]
m_H (p.p. per point)	0.465	[0.434, 0.490]
Self-fulfilling share ϕ	1.08	[0.32, 2.25] (0.13, 4.29)

Notes: This table collects the inputs to the self-fulfilling share $\phi = \tau_H/m_H$ of Equation (3) for the major derogatory scorecard. The reduced form, the first stage, and the Wald ratio τ_H of Equation (2) carry honest 95 percent confidence intervals (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). For τ_H , we report the bias-aware interval of Noack and Rothe (2024). The calibration slope m_H , evaluated at the in-bandwidth average score of 610 (Appendix Figure A.10), carries a 95 percent confidence interval from a clustered bootstrap with 1,000 draws. For the self-fulfilling share ϕ , the interval in brackets is the clustered bootstrap and the interval in parentheses is the Noack and Rothe (2024) bias-aware interval.


Online Appendix

“Self-Fulfilling Credit Scores”

Victor Duarte and Julia Fonseca


A Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A.1: VantageScore Use Distribution by User Type, 2023




Notes: This figure shows the distribution of VantageScore credit score uses across user types in 2023, based on data from all three major credit reporting companies. Credit card issuers account for 37% of the 27 billion uses of VantageScore in 2023 and 78% of uses by financial institutions. Source: [Courchane, Gailey, and Fronk \(2024\)](#), Table 1.

Figure A.2: Covariate Smoothness: Demographics




Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the running variable and three demographic variables, measured in $t - 1$. The running variable is the number of days between a consumer's initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. The corresponding RD estimates from Equation (1) are reported in Panel A of Table A.3.

Figure A.3: Covariate Smoothness: Credit-Seeking Behavior




Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the running variable and three measures of credit-seeking behavior, each defined for the two inquiries that form the running variable. Panel (a) plots the number of distinct lenders behind the two inquiries, measured as unique combinations of industry and subscriber codes. Panel (b) plots a binary variable that takes the value of one if both inquiries come from banks, measured from the lender's industry code. Panel (c) plots a binary variable that takes the value of one if the two inquiries are of the same major type (e.g. mortgage, auto, or bankcard). The product category is measured from the inquiry's type code, supplemented by the lender's industry code when the type code carries no product information. The corresponding RD estimates from Equation (1) are reported in Panel B of Table A.3.

Figure A.4: Density of the Running Variable




Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the running variable, the number of days between each initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. The dashed vertical line marks the 14-day de-duplication boundary and the shaded band marks the $[6, 22]$ window from which the estimation sample is drawn. The distribution bunches at weekly multiples—7, 14, 21, and 28 days—reflecting the day-of-week rhythm of credit applications. The excess mass at day 14 is statistically indistinguishable from the excess mass at the other weekly bunching days (p-value = 0.38).


Figure A.5: Falsification Tests: Access to Credit




(a) Credit score



(b) Total Balance (\$)




(c) New Accounts (#)




(d) Inquiries (#)

Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the running variable at t and four measures of credit access measured at $t - 1$. The running variable is the number of days between a consumer's initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. The corresponding RD estimates from Equation (1) are reported in Panel A of Table A.4.


Figure A.6: Falsification Tests: Financial Distress




(a) Balance 90 Day+ Delinquent (\$)



(b) 90 Day+ Delinquency (p.p.)




(c) Accounts in Collection (#)




(d) Bankruptcies (p.p.)

Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the running variable at t and four measures of financial distress measured at $t - 1$. The running variable is the number of days between a consumer's initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. The corresponding RD estimates from Equation (1) are reported in Panel B of Table A.4.


Figure A.7: Placebo Test: 7-Day Cutoff




(a) Full Sample: Credit Score



(b) Full Sample: Delinquency at $t + 2$




(c) Major Derogatory: Credit Score




(d) Major Derogatory: Delinquency at $t + 2$

Notes: This figure applies the research design to a placebo cutoff at 7 days, using major inquiries with day gaps between 3 and 11. The de-duplication rule implies no discontinuity at 7 days: on both sides of the placebo cutoff, the second inquiry falls within the initial 14-day window and is de-duplicated. Panels (a) and (c) show the change in credit scores from $t - 1$ to t for the full placebo sample and the major derogatory scorecard. Panels (b) and (d) plot an indicator equal to 100 if the consumer has any account reported 90 or more days past due during the 12 months ending at $t + 2$. The corresponding RD estimates from Equation (1) are reported in Table A.5.


Figure A.8: Placebo Test: 21-Day Cutoff




(a) Full Sample: Credit Score



(b) Full Sample: Delinquency at $t + 2$




(c) Major Derogatory: Credit Score




(d) Major Derogatory: Delinquency at $t + 2$

Notes: This figure applies the research design to a placebo cutoff at 21 days, using major inquiries with day gaps between 17 and 25. The de-duplication rule implies no discontinuity at 21 days: on both sides of the placebo cutoff, the second inquiry falls outside the initial 14-day window and is counted separately. Panels (a) and (c) show the change in credit scores from $t - 1$ to t for the full placebo sample and the major derogatory scorecard. Panels (b) and (d) plot an indicator equal to 100 if the consumer has any account reported 90 or more days past due during the 12 months ending at $t + 2$. The corresponding RD estimates from Equation (1) are reported in Table A.6.


Figure A.9: Placebo Test: Never-De-Duplicated Inquiry Types




(a) Full Sample: Credit Score



(b) Full Sample: Delinquency at $t + 2$




(c) Major Derogatory: Credit Score



(d) Major Derogatory: Delinquency at $t + 2$


Notes: This figure applies the research design to retail, utility, and collection inquiries, which the credit scoring model does not de-duplicate, and so the rule implies no discontinuity at 14 days. Panels (a) and (c) show the change in credit scores from $t - 1$ to t for the full placebo sample and the major derogatory scorecard. Panels (b) and (d) plot an indicator equal to 100 if the consumer has any account reported 90 or more days past due during the 12 months ending at $t + 2$. The corresponding RD estimates from Equation (1) are reported in Table A.7.

Figure A.10: Score-to-Default Calibration for the Major Derogatory Scorecard




Notes: This figure shows the probability of any new serious delinquency by $t + 2$ against the credit score at t for the major derogatory scorecard. Dots are empirical means in ten-point score bins; the line is a natural cubic spline logit fit. The dotted vertical line marks the in-bandwidth average score of 610, at which the calibration slope is $m_H = 0.46$ percentage points per point, which we use to construct the self-fulfilling share ϕ in Section 3.2.

Figure A.11: Rank-Aligned Causal Feedback




Notes: This figure provides empirical support for Assumption 1. For the major derogatory scorecard, it plots cumulative distributions over predicted default risk r^N of three groups: adversely revised borrowers, weighted by the revision a_i as in equation (16), whose distribution locates the score-induced marginal defaults under the model; realized defaulters, consumers with any new serious delinquency by $t + 2$; and realized non-defaulters. Predicted risk is $r^N = g(s_{\text{post}})$, where g is the calibration curve of Figure A.10 and s_{post} is the credit score after the revision, and the adverse revision $a_i = \max\{g(s_{\text{post},i}) - g(s_{\text{pre},i}), 0\}$ is the increase in predicted risk implied by the score decline, the probability-scale revision of Section 4. Shaded regions are pointwise 95 percent confidence bands from a clustered bootstrap over consumers that re-estimates the calibration curve in each of 1,000 draws. The revision-weighted distribution lies weakly to the right of both outcome distributions at every point, so adverse revisions are concentrated among borrowers the score already ranks riskiest.


Figure A.12: Separation Metrics Along the Smoothing Path




(a) AUC at the point estimate of ϕ



(b) KS at the point estimate of ϕ



(c) AUC across the ϕ confidence interval



(d) KS across the ϕ confidence interval

Notes: This figure traces two common rank-separation metrics along the counterfactual smoothing path of Section 4. For each consumer in the major derogatory scorecard, the smoothed forecast is $p_i(\lambda) = r_i^N - \lambda a_i$ and the counterfactual default probability is $q_i(\lambda) = r_i^N - \hat{\phi} \lambda a_i$, with r_i^N and a_i constructed as in Figure A.11 and $\hat{\phi}$ taken from Table 4. AUC and KS are computed in expectation over default outcomes realized with probability $q_i(\lambda)$, ranking consumers by the smoothed score. Pooled paths rank all consumers in the estimation sample together, holding the scores and default probabilities of consumers outside the major derogatory scorecard fixed. Panels (c) and (d) evaluate ϕ at the endpoints of the honest confidence interval (Table 4). For values of ϕ above one, each path ends at the largest λ for which all counterfactual default probabilities remain nonnegative. Horizontal dashed grey lines mark each metric's no-smoothing value.

Table A.1: Summary Statistics by Scorecard

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Major derogatory			Clean file			Thin-young		
	Mean	St. Dev.	Median	Mean	St. Dev.	Median	Mean	St. Dev.	Median
A. Demographics									
Income (\$1,000)	50.87	24.30	44.00	75.62	41.51	63.00	33.15	13.96	31.00
Age (years)	44.11	12.76	43.00	46.12	14.56	44.00	37.35	13.73	35.00
Female (%)	54.37	49.81	100.00	43.93	49.63	0.00	46.85	49.90	0.00
B. Access to Credit									
Credit Score	613.73	77.98	612.00	739.89	73.69	753.00	600.74	78.96	597.00
Total Balance (\$1,000)	94.15	143.39	39.23	214.05	345.39	114.47	23.40	71.44	2.12
Credit Card Balance (\$1,000)	4.66	8.10	1.73	10.50	14.83	5.32	1.15	3.02	0.05
Credit Card Limit (\$1,000)	12.29	20.43	4.75	48.47	45.86	36.00	3.36	8.92	0.50
Number of Accounts	18.78	12.12	16.00	20.74	12.74	18.00	7.00	7.57	5.00
New Inquiries in Last 12 Months	4.85	5.77	3.00	2.71	3.53	2.00	4.61	6.06	3.00
New Accounts in Last 12 Months	2.15	2.42	1.00	1.75	1.96	1.00	1.52	2.01	1.00
New Credit Card Accounts in Last 12 Months	1.22	1.76	1.00	0.98	1.42	1.00	0.86	1.43	0.00
C. Financial Distress									
Number of Accounts 90+ Days Past Due	0.81	1.89	0.00	0.06	0.44	0.00	0.45	1.28	0.00
Balance 90+ Days Past Due (\$1,000)	2.80	20.01	0.00	0.37	9.28	0.00	1.04	9.86	0.00
Number of Collections	2.24	2.89	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.71	2.94	1.00
Bankruptcy (%)	14.00	34.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.10	27.28	0.00
Observations	175,250			249,655			276,057		

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the estimation sample by scorecard, as defined in Section 2. All variables are measured at $t - 1$, the year before the inquiries.

Table A.2: Effect of an Additional Counted Inquiry on $t + 1$ Delinquency

	Full sample	Major derogatory	Clean file	Thin-young
ABOVE	0.10 [-1.72, 1.92]	1.07 [-1.60, 3.73]	0.54 [-1.38, 2.47]	-0.81 [-3.18, 1.56]
Control Mean	26.51	35.27	10.38	35.44
Optimal Bandwidth	± 4	± 4	± 4	± 4
Observations				
Total	580,088	145,890	205,593	228,605
In-Bandwidth	244,885	62,324	85,880	96,681

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficient β and honest 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (1), where the outcome is an indicator equal to 100 if the consumer has any account reported 90 or more days past due during the 12 months ending at $t + 1$. The running variable is the number of days between a consumer’s initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. Columns split the sample by the scorecards defined in Section 2. We report honest confidence intervals in brackets (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). Control Mean reports the mean of the dependent variable on the control side of the bandwidth. The reported optimal bandwidth minimizes the length of the honest confidence interval. “In-Bandwidth” observations report the number of observations falling within this window, while “Total” observations report the full estimation sample. A */**/** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on honest confidence intervals.

Table A.3: Covariate Smoothness

<i>Panel A: Demographics</i>			
	Income (\$1,000)	Age (years)	Female (p.p.)
ABOVE	0.22 [-3.81, 4.26]	0.07 [-1.03, 1.17]	0.09 [-2.53, 2.72]
Control Mean	52.65	42.16	47.84
Bandwidth	± 4	± 4	± 4
Observations			
Total	700,854	699,694	646,592
In-Bandwidth	295,694	295,194	272,786
<i>Panel B: Credit-Seeking Behavior</i>			
	Distinct Lenders (#)	Both Inquiries from a Bank (p.p.)	Same Inquiry Type (p.p.)
ABOVE	-0.01 [-0.04, 0.02]	-0.15 [-3.98, 3.68]	0.08 [-2.67, 2.84]
Control Mean	1.84	28.11	64.65
Bandwidth	± 4	± 4	± 4
Observations			
Total	700,962	700,962	582,041
In-Bandwidth	295,739	295,739	244,854

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficient β from Equation (1) for the demographic variables shown in Figure A.2 (Panel A) and the measures of credit-seeking behavior shown in Figure A.3 (Panel B). The running variable is the number of days between a consumer's initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. We report honest confidence intervals in brackets (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). Control Mean reports the mean of the dependent variable on the control side of the bandwidth. "In-Bandwidth" observations report the number of observations falling within this window, while "Total" observations report the full estimation sample. A */**/** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on honest confidence intervals.

Table A.4: Falsification Tests

<i>Panel A: Access to Credit</i>				
	Credit Score	Total Balance (\$)	New Accounts (#)	Inquiries (#)
ABOVE	-0.57 [-8.73, 7.58]	1,149 [-15,329, 17,627]	-0.01 [-0.11, 0.10]	-0.06 [-0.19, 0.07]
Control Mean	653	108,398	1.77	4.01
Bandwidth	± 4	± 4	± 4	± 4
Observations				
Total	700,962	700,962	700,962	700,962
In-Bandwidth	295,739	295,739	295,739	295,739
<i>Panel B: Financial Distress</i>				
	Balance 90 Day+ Delinquent (\$)	90 Day+ Delinquency (p.p.)	Accounts in Collection (#)	Bankruptcies (p.p.)
ABOVE	101 [-332, 534]	0.23 [-2.72, 3.18]	-0.02 [-0.16, 0.13]	0.24 [-0.93, 1.42]
Control Mean	1,256	10.49	1.23	6.73
Bandwidth	± 4	± 4	± 4	± 4
Observations				
Total	700,962	700,962	700,962	700,962
In-Bandwidth	295,739	295,739	295,739	295,739

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficient β from Equation (1) for the measures of credit access shown in Figure A.5 (Panel A) and the measures of financial distress shown in Figure A.6 (Panel B), all measured at $t - 1$. The running variable is the number of days between a consumer’s initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. We report honest confidence intervals in brackets (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). Control Mean reports the mean of the dependent variable on the control side of the bandwidth. “In-Bandwidth” observations report the number of observations falling within this window, while “Total” observations report the full estimation sample. A */**/** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on honest confidence intervals.

Table A.5: Placebo Test: 7-Day Cutoff

	Full sample		Major derogatory	
	Credit Score	Delinquency	Credit Score	Delinquency
ABOVE	0.19 [-1.80, 2.19]	-0.13 [-2.62, 2.36]	0.39 [-2.47, 3.25]	-1.09 [-4.37, 2.19]
Control Mean	655	28.09	613	38.18
Optimal Bandwidth	± 3	± 4	± 3	± 4
Observations				
Total	579,646	374,276	142,132	92,056
In-Bandwidth	366,121	331,089	90,438	81,261

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficient β and honest 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (1) at the placebo cutoff of 7 days shown in Figure A.7, using major inquiries with day gaps between 3 and 11. Credit Score is the change in credit scores from $t - 1$ to t , in points. Delinquency is an indicator equal to 100 if the consumer has any account reported 90 or more days past due during the 12 months ending at $t + 2$. We report honest confidence intervals in brackets (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). Control Mean reports the mean score at $t - 1$ in the Credit Score columns and the mean of the dependent variable in the Delinquency columns, on the control side of the bandwidth. The reported optimal bandwidth minimizes the length of the honest confidence interval. “In-Bandwidth” observations report the number of observations falling within this window, while “Total” observations report the full estimation sample. A */**/** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on honest confidence intervals.

Table A.6: Placebo Test: 21-Day Cutoff

	Full sample		Major derogatory	
	Credit Score	Delinquency	Credit Score	Delinquency
ABOVE	0.96 [-1.29, 3.21]	-0.60 [-3.27, 2.07]	0.95 [-2.30, 4.20]	-0.87 [-4.47, 2.73]
Control Mean	644	28.76	609	37.80
Optimal Bandwidth	± 3	± 4	± 3	± 4
Observations				
Total	333,021	214,936	88,395	57,459
In-Bandwidth	219,409	188,245	58,305	50,415

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficient β and honest 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (1) at the placebo cutoff of 21 days shown in Figure A.8, using major inquiries with day gaps between 17 and 25. Credit Score is the change in credit scores from $t - 1$ to t , in points. Delinquency is an indicator equal to 100 if the consumer has any account reported 90 or more days past due during the 12 months ending at $t + 2$. We report honest confidence intervals in brackets (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). Control Mean reports the mean score at $t - 1$ in the Credit Score columns and the mean of the dependent variable in the Delinquency columns, on the control side of the bandwidth. The reported optimal bandwidth minimizes the length of the honest confidence interval. “In-Bandwidth” observations report the number of observations falling within this window, while “Total” observations report the full estimation sample. A */**/** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on honest confidence intervals.

Table A.7: Placebo Test: Never-De-Duplicated Inquiry Types

	Full sample		Major derogatory	
	Credit Score	Delinquency	Credit Score	Delinquency
ABOVE	2.04 [-7.81, 11.90]	3.90 [-3.56, 11.35]	11.69 [-5.60, 28.97]	7.69 [-5.85, 21.24]
Control Mean	620	26.93	601	33.86
Optimal Bandwidth	± 3	± 4	± 3	± 4
Observations				
Total	12,807	9,789	4,026	3,078
In-Bandwidth	4,184	4,319	1,307	1,362

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficient β and honest 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (1) applied to retail, utility, and collection inquiries, which the credit scoring model does not de-duplicate, as shown in Figure A.9. Credit Score is the change in credit scores from $t - 1$ to t , in points. Delinquency is an indicator equal to 100 if the consumer has any account reported 90 or more days past due during the 12 months ending at $t + 2$. We report honest confidence intervals in brackets (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). Control Mean reports the mean score at $t - 1$ in the Credit Score columns and the mean of the dependent variable in the Delinquency columns, on the control side of the bandwidth. The reported optimal bandwidth minimizes the length of the honest confidence interval. “In-Bandwidth” observations report the number of observations falling within this window, while “Total” observations report the full estimation sample. A */**/** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on honest confidence intervals.

Table A.8: Effect of an Additional Counted Inquiry by FICO De-Duplication Status

<i>Panel A: Pairs No FICO Model De-Duplicates</i>				
	Full sample		Major derogatory	
	Credit Score	Delinquency	Credit Score	Delinquency
ABOVE	-5.10*** [-7.39, -2.81]	0.02 [-2.13, 2.17]	-6.65*** [-10.24, -3.07]	3.69** [0.37, 7.02]
Control Mean	640	31.76	608	39.47
Optimal Bandwidth	± 3	± 4	± 3	± 4
Observations				
Total	407,563	251,490	110,219	69,462
In-Bandwidth	135,975	111,797	36,674	30,935
<i>Panel B: Same-Type Mortgage, Auto, and Student Loan Pairs</i>				
	Full sample		Major derogatory	
	Credit Score	Delinquency	Credit Score	Delinquency
ABOVE	-4.39*** [-7.07, -1.70]	-0.22 [-2.58, 2.13]	-4.13 [-9.47, 1.20]	2.48 [-2.16, 7.12]
Control Mean	684	19.37	630	29.66
Optimal Bandwidth	± 3	± 4	± 3	± 4
Observations				
Total	212,839	147,522	43,449	29,980
In-Bandwidth	60,726	56,456	12,419	11,452

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficient β and honest 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (1), splitting the estimation sample by whether FICO models de-duplicate the two inquiries that form the running variable. FICO de-duplicates only same-type mortgage, auto, and student loan inquiries and never de-duplicates credit card inquiries (Section 2.1). Panel A uses pairs that no FICO model de-duplicates: either inquiry is for a credit card, or the two inquiries are for different products. Panel B uses same-type mortgage, auto, and student loan pairs, for which older FICO models also de-duplicate at the 14-day threshold. Credit Score is the change in credit scores from $t - 1$ to t , in points. Delinquency is an indicator equal to 100 if the consumer has any account reported 90 or more days past due during the 12 months ending at $t + 2$. We report honest confidence intervals in brackets (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). Control Mean reports the mean score at $t - 1$ in the Credit Score columns and the mean of the dependent variable in the Delinquency columns, on the control side of the bandwidth. The reported optimal bandwidth minimizes the length of the honest confidence interval. “In-Bandwidth” observations report the number of observations falling within this window, while “Total” observations report the full estimation sample. A */**/** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on honest confidence intervals.

Table A.9: Effect of an Additional Counted Inquiry on Credit Card Outcomes

<i>Panel A: New Credit Card Accounts (#)</i>				
	Full sample	Major derogatory	Clean file	Thin-young
ABOVE	-0.04* [-0.08, 0.00]	-0.04 [-0.12, 0.04]	-0.07** [-0.12, -0.01]	-0.01 [-0.07, 0.05]
Control Mean	1.03	1.35	0.87	0.96
Optimal Bandwidth	± 4	± 4	± 4	± 4
Observations				
Total	580,088	145,890	205,593	228,605
In-Bandwidth	244,885	62,324	85,880	96,681
<i>Panel B: Change in Credit Card Limit (\$)</i>				
	Full sample	Major derogatory	Clean file	Thin-young
ABOVE	-959** [-1,900, -18]	-1,217* [-2,525, 91]	-1,745** [-3,367, -123]	-35 [-940, 870]
Control Mean	21,701	12,336	48,500	3,392
Optimal Bandwidth	± 2	± 2	± 2	± 2
Observations				
Total	580,088	145,890	205,593	228,605
In-Bandwidth	123,778	31,518	43,579	48,681
<i>Panel C: Change in Credit Card Balance (\$)</i>				
	Full sample	Major derogatory	Clean file	Thin-young
ABOVE	-232 [-690, 226]	-581* [-1,190, 27]	-81 [-823, 661]	-136 [-544, 272]
Control Mean	5,323	4,632	10,424	1,138
Optimal Bandwidth	± 3	± 3	± 3	± 3
Observations				
Total	580,088	145,890	205,593	228,605
In-Bandwidth	183,906	46,756	64,670	72,480

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficient β and honest 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (1) for credit card outcomes, all measured at $t + 1$, the year after the inquiries. In Panel A, the outcome is the number of credit card accounts opened in the 12 months ending at $t + 1$. In Panel B, the outcome is the change in the total credit limit on open credit card accounts between $t - 1$ and $t + 1$, in dollars. In Panel C, the outcome is the change in the total balance on open credit card accounts between $t - 1$ and $t + 1$, in dollars. The running variable is the number of days between a consumer’s initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. Columns split the sample by the scorecards defined in Section 2. We report honest confidence intervals in brackets (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). Control Mean reports the mean of the dependent variable on the control side of the bandwidth in Panel A, and the $t - 1$ level of the total credit card limit and balance in Panels B and C. The reported optimal bandwidth minimizes the length of the honest confidence interval. “In-Bandwidth” observations report the number of observations falling within this window, while “Total” observations report the full estimation sample. A */**/** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on honest confidence intervals.

Table A.10: Placebo Test: Effect on Mortgage and Auto Outcomes

<i>Panel A: New Mortgage Accounts (#)</i>				
	Full sample	Major derogatory	Clean file	Thin-young
ABOVE	-0.01 [-0.03, 0.02]	0.01 [-0.02, 0.04]	-0.02 [-0.05, 0.01]	-0.00 [-0.02, 0.02]
Control Mean	0.11	0.08	0.19	0.05
Optimal Bandwidth	± 3	± 3	± 3	± 3
Observations				
Total	580,088	145,890	205,593	228,605
In-Bandwidth	183,906	46,756	64,670	72,480
<i>Panel B: Change in Mortgage Balance (\$)</i>				
	Full sample	Major derogatory	Clean file	Thin-young
ABOVE	-3,836 [-16,143, 8,471]	-2,814 [-17,267, 11,640]	-9,096 [-29,646, 11,453]	745 [-10,381, 11,870]
Control Mean	78,968	55,261	169,074	12,423
Optimal Bandwidth	± 2	± 2	± 2	± 2
Observations				
Total	580,088	145,890	205,593	228,605
In-Bandwidth	123,778	31,518	43,579	48,681
<i>Panel C: New Auto Accounts (#)</i>				
	Full sample	Major derogatory	Clean file	Thin-young
ABOVE	0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]	0.01 [-0.01, 0.02]	-0.01 [-0.02, 0.01]	0.01 [-0.00, 0.02]
Control Mean	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.08
Optimal Bandwidth	± 3	± 3	± 3	± 3
Observations				
Total	580,088	145,890	205,593	228,605
In-Bandwidth	183,906	46,756	64,670	72,480
<i>Panel D: Change in Auto Balance (\$)</i>				
	Full sample	Major derogatory	Clean file	Thin-young
ABOVE	96 [-1,183, 1,375]	784 [-1,198, 2,767]	-1,508 [-3,431, 416]	1,070 [-395, 2,534]
Control Mean	12,191	14,367	15,705	7,607
Optimal Bandwidth	± 2	± 2	± 2	± 2
Observations				
Total	580,088	145,890	205,593	228,605
In-Bandwidth	123,778	31,518	43,579	48,681

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficient β and honest 95 percent confidence intervals from Equation (1) for mortgage and auto loan outcomes, all measured at $t + 1$, the year after the inquiries. Mortgage originators and auto lenders together account for less than 2 percent of VantageScore uses (Appendix Figure A.1), so the score shock should not affect these markets. In Panel A, the outcome is the number of mortgage accounts opened in the 12 months ending at $t + 1$. In Panel B, the outcome is the change in the total balance on open mortgage accounts between $t - 1$ and $t + 1$, in dollars. In Panel C, the outcome is the number of auto loan accounts opened in the 6 months ending at $t + 1$. In Panel D, the outcome is the change in the total balance on open auto loan accounts between $t - 1$ and $t + 1$, in dollars. The running variable is the number of days between a consumer’s initial inquiry and the next major inquiry. Columns split the sample by the scorecards defined in Section 2. We report honest confidence intervals in brackets (Armstrong and Kolesár, 2020; Kolesár and Rothe, 2018). Control Mean reports the mean of the dependent variable on the control side of the bandwidth in Panels A and C, and the $t - 1$ level of the total mortgage and auto balance in Panels B and D. The reported optimal bandwidth minimizes the length of the honest confidence interval. “In-Bandwidth” observations report the number of observations falling within this window, while “Total” observations report the full estimation sample. A */**/** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on honest confidence intervals.

B Model Appendix

This appendix contains proofs and derivations for the model in Section 4.

B.1 Proof of Theorem 1

Proof. The effect on default follows directly from (7). For any $\lambda > 0$,

$$D_H(\lambda) - D_H(0) = -\phi\lambda\mathbb{E}_H[a_i] < 0, \quad (19)$$

where the strict inequality uses $\phi > 0$, $\lambda > 0$, and assumption (4).

For the credit scorer's loss, fix an H borrower and write $p = p_i^N$ and $a = a_i$. Along the smoothing path,

$$p(\lambda) = p - \lambda a, \quad q(\lambda) = p - \phi\lambda a. \quad (20)$$

The derivative of expected loss at the status quo is

$$\begin{aligned} \left. \frac{d}{d\lambda} L(p(\lambda), q(\lambda)) \right|_{\lambda=0} &= L_p(p, p)(-a) + L_q(p, p)(-\phi a) \\ &= -\phi a L_q(p, p), \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

where the second equality uses the first-order condition of local propriety, $L_p(p, p) = 0$; the derivative exists because $p \in \mathcal{P}$ by (11), so L is continuously differentiable near (p, p) and $(p(\lambda), q(\lambda))$ lies in that neighborhood for λ small. If $a > 0$, Definition 1 implies $L_q(p, p) > 0$, so the derivative in (21) is strictly negative; if $a = 0$, the borrower's loss term is constant in λ . Averaging over the finite H population, $\mathcal{L}_H$ is right-differentiable at zero with

$$\mathcal{L}'_H(0) = -\phi\mathbb{E}_H[a_i L_q(p_i^N, p_i^N)] < 0, \quad (22)$$

where the strict inequality holds because every term $a_i L_q(p_i^N, p_i^N)$ is nonnegative and, by (4), positive for a positive fraction of H borrowers. Since $\mathcal{L}_H$ is right-differentiable at zero with $\mathcal{L}'_H(0) < 0$, there exists $\bar{\lambda} \in (0, 1]$ such that $\mathcal{L}_H(\lambda) < \mathcal{L}_H(0)$ for all $\lambda \in (0, \bar{\lambda}]$. Since $\lambda_L = 0$ leaves both scores and outcomes unchanged for L borrowers, the type-specific rule is a Pareto

improvement. □

Note that condition (11) is sufficient but not necessary. The proof uses it only to sign each term of $\mathcal{L}'_H(0) = -\phi \mathbb{E}_H[a_i L_q(p_i^N, p_i^N)]$. Provided L is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of (p_i^N, p_i^N) for every H borrower with $a_i > 0$, the conclusion of Theorem 1 holds whenever the revision-weighted average $\mathbb{E}_H[a_i L_q(p_i^N, p_i^N)]$ is strictly positive, even if $L_q(p_i^N, p_i^N) \leq 0$ for some borrowers.

B.2 Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. Every ratio in (15) is strictly positive, because the pairs over which the minimum is taken have $p_i^N - p_j^N > 0$ and $a_i - a_j > 0$, and with finitely many borrowers the minimum runs over finitely many pairs; hence $\bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}} > 0$. Distinct naive scores and μ_H strictly decreasing imply distinct naive forecasts, so every pair of borrowers is strictly ordered by the naive forecast. Fix $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ with $\lambda < \bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}}$ and a pair of borrowers with $p_i^N > p_j^N$. If $a_i \leq a_j$, then

$$p_i(\lambda) - p_j(\lambda) = (p_i^N - p_j^N) - \lambda(a_i - a_j) \geq p_i^N - p_j^N > 0. \quad (23)$$

If $a_i > a_j$, then $\lambda(a_i - a_j) < \bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}}(a_i - a_j) \leq p_i^N - p_j^N$ by the definition of $\bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}}$, so again $p_i(\lambda) > p_j(\lambda)$. Smoothed forecasts therefore preserve the strict ordering of naive forecasts. Since $p_i^N = \mu_H(s_i^N)$ and $s_i(\lambda) = \mu_H^{-1}(p_i(\lambda))$ with μ_H strictly decreasing, smoothed scores are strictly increasing in naive scores across the finitely many support points, and any strictly increasing interpolation through the points $(s_i^N, s_i(\lambda))$ gives the required φ_λ . □

B.3 Proof of Theorem 2

Proof. Smoothing strictly lowers default exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1: $D_H(\lambda) - D_H(0) = -\phi \lambda \mathbb{E}_H[a_i] < 0$ by $\phi > 0$ and (4).

It remains to show that smoothing cannot raise the rank-separation objective. Because $\lambda < \bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}}$, Lemma 1 applies: the smoothed score is a strictly increasing transformation of the naive score, and since the metric depends on scores only through their ranks, the credit scorer's objective under

smoothing coincides with $\mathfrak{R}(F_1^\lambda, F_0^\lambda)$ evaluated in the naive score coordinate. Let

$$Q_0 = \mathbb{E}_H[p_i^N], \quad Q_\lambda = \mathbb{E}_H[q_i(\lambda)] = Q_0 - \phi\lambda\mathbb{E}_H[a_i] < Q_0 \quad (24)$$

be the total default probabilities under the naive and smoothed rules, and let $N_0 = 1 - Q_0$ and $N_\lambda = 1 - Q_\lambda$ denote the corresponding non-default probabilities; $Q_0, N_0 \in (0, 1)$ because $p_i^N \in (0, 1)$, $Q_\lambda = D_H(\lambda) > 0$ by hypothesis, and $N_\lambda \geq N_0 > 0$. Smoothing by λ removes default mass $\phi\lambda a_i \geq 0$ from each borrower and adds the same mass to the non-default state. The score distribution of the removed default mass is F_C from (16). Conditioning on realized default status, the score distribution among realized defaulters after smoothing is

$$F_1^\lambda(s) = \frac{Q_0 F_1^0(s) - \phi\lambda\mathbb{E}_H[a_i] F_C(s)}{Q_0 - \phi\lambda\mathbb{E}_H[a_i]}, \quad (25)$$

a legitimate distribution function because its numerator equals $\mathbb{E}_H[q_i(\lambda)\mathbf{1}\{s_i^N \leq s\}]$, which is nonnegative and nondecreasing in s since $q_i(\lambda) \in [0, 1]$; the same argument with weights $1 - q_i(\lambda)$ applies to F_0^λ below. Subtracting $F_1^0(s)$ gives

$$F_1^\lambda(s) - F_1^0(s) = \frac{\phi\lambda\mathbb{E}_H[a_i]}{Q_0 - \phi\lambda\mathbb{E}_H[a_i]} [F_1^0(s) - F_C(s)] \leq 0, \quad (26)$$

where the inequality follows from Assumption 1. Therefore, smoothing shifts the score distribution of defaulters weakly upward toward safer scores.

The score distribution among realized non-defaulters after smoothing is

$$F_0^\lambda(s) = \frac{N_0 F_0^0(s) + \phi\lambda\mathbb{E}_H[a_i] F_C(s)}{N_0 + \phi\lambda\mathbb{E}_H[a_i]}. \quad (27)$$

Subtracting $F_0^0(s)$ gives

$$F_0^\lambda(s) - F_0^0(s) = \frac{\phi\lambda\mathbb{E}_H[a_i]}{N_0 + \phi\lambda\mathbb{E}_H[a_i]} [F_C(s) - F_0^0(s)] \geq 0, \quad (28)$$

again by Assumption 1. Smoothing thus shifts the score distribution of non-defaulters weakly downward toward riskier scores.

Combining these two dominance relations, the naive rule has weakly more score-rank separation than the smoothed rule:

$$F_1^0(s) \geq F_1^\lambda(s), \quad F_0^0(s) \leq F_0^\lambda(s) \quad \text{for all } s. \quad (29)$$

Definition 2 therefore implies

$$\mathfrak{R}(F_1^0, F_0^0) \geq \mathfrak{R}(F_1^\lambda, F_0^\lambda). \quad (30)$$

□

B.4 Covered separation metrics

This subsection shows that AUC and KS are rank-separation metrics in the sense of Definition 2, and that recall-at-top- p and top- p lift are covered by Corollary 1 once their cutoff is fixed by Lemma 2.

Write the tie-corrected AUC of a pair of score-rank distributions (F_1, F_0) as

$$\text{AUC}(F_1, F_0) = \mathbb{P}(S_0 > S_1) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{P}(S_0 = S_1) = \int h_{F_1}(s) dF_0(s), \quad h_{F_1}(s) = \frac{1}{2} [F_1(s) + F_1(s^-)], \quad (31)$$

where $S_1 \sim F_1$ and $S_0 \sim F_0$ are independent. Both AUC and $\text{KS}(F_1, F_0) = \sup_s [F_1(s) - F_0(s)]$ depend on scores only through ranks: a strictly increasing transformation applied to both distributions relabels the score axis without changing any of the probabilities in (31) or the set of pointwise differences over which the supremum is taken. For monotonicity, suppose $\tilde{F}_1 \geq F_1$ and $\tilde{F}_0 \leq F_0$ pointwise as in (14). Pointwise ordering of distribution functions is inherited by their left limits, so $h_{\tilde{F}_1} \geq h_{F_1}$ pointwise, and $h_{\tilde{F}_1}$ is bounded and nondecreasing. Then

$$\text{AUC}(\tilde{F}_1, \tilde{F}_0) = \int h_{\tilde{F}_1} d\tilde{F}_0 \geq \int h_{F_1} d\tilde{F}_0 \geq \int h_{F_1} dF_0 = \text{AUC}(F_1, F_0), \quad (32)$$

where the first inequality is pointwise dominance of the integrand and the second holds because $\tilde{F}_0 \leq F_0$ means $\tilde{F}_0$ first-order stochastically dominates F_0 and h_{F_1} is nondecreasing. For KS, $\tilde{F}_1 - \tilde{F}_0 \geq F_1 - F_0$ pointwise, so the supremum is weakly larger. Both metrics are therefore rank-separation metrics.

Lemma 2 (Smoothing preserves the score distribution). *For every $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ and every s ,*

$$Q_\lambda F_1^\lambda(s) + N_\lambda F_0^\lambda(s) = \mathbb{P}(s_i^N \leq s \mid T_i = H), \quad (33)$$

where $Q_\lambda = D_H(\lambda)$ and $N_\lambda = 1 - Q_\lambda$. In particular, a cutoff defined as a fixed share of the H population is unchanged by smoothing.

Proof. The left side equals $\mathbb{E}_H[q_i(\lambda)\mathbf{1}\{s_i^N \leq s\}] + \mathbb{E}_H[(1 - q_i(\lambda))\mathbf{1}\{s_i^N \leq s\}] = \mathbb{P}(s_i^N \leq s \mid T_i = H)$: smoothing reallocates probability mass between the default and non-default states of each borrower at a fixed score. $\square$

For a fixed population share p , define the top-group cutoff $s_p = \inf\{s : \mathbb{P}(s_i^N \leq s \mid T_i = H) \geq p\}$, which is invariant to smoothing by Lemma 2, as is the realized top-group share $\hat{p} = \mathbb{P}(s_i^N \leq s_p \mid T_i = H)$, which exceeds p when an atom sits at the cutoff. The cutoff is defined in the naive score coordinate; for $\lambda < \bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}}$, Lemma 1 implies that the scorer's top group on reported scores contains exactly the borrowers in the naive-coordinate bottom- $\hat{p}$ group, so the naive-coordinate expressions below equal the deployed metrics. Recall-at-top- p equals $F_1(s_p)$ and top- p lift equals $F_1(s_p)/\hat{p}$. With s_p and $\hat{p}$ fixed, both are weakly increasing in F_1 pointwise, so both satisfy the monotonicity in Definition 2.

B.5 Proof of Corollary 1

Proof. Membership of AUC and KS in the class of Definition 2 is established in Appendix B.4; recall and lift are covered directly, with their cutoff s_p and realized share $\hat{p}$ fixed along the path by Lemma 2. For recall and lift, the difference formula (26) evaluated at s_p shows $F_1^\lambda(s_p) < F_1^0(s_p)$ whenever $F_C(s_p) > F_1^0(s_p)$; lift falls strictly with recall because its denominator $\hat{p}$ is fixed. For KS, write $g_\lambda = F_1^\lambda - F_0^\lambda$ and $d_\lambda = \phi\lambda\mathbb{E}_H[a_i]/N_\lambda \in (0, 1)$. Assumption 1 gives $F_C - F_0^0 \geq F_1^0 - F_0^0 = g_0$ pointwise, so the difference formulas (26) and (28) imply

$$g_\lambda \leq g_0 - d_\lambda(F_C - F_0^0) \leq (1 - d_\lambda)g_0, \quad (34)$$

hence $\sup_s g_\lambda(s) \leq (1 - d_\lambda) \sup_s g_0(s) < \sup_s g_0(s)$ whenever the naive KS is positive; it is positive except in the single-score case because, under the status quo calibration with μ_H decreasing, $F_1^0 \geq F_0^0$ pointwise with strict inequality at some s . For AUC, writing the tie-corrected statistic as in (31) and using (25) and (27),

$$\text{AUC}(0) - \text{AUC}(\lambda) = \frac{\phi \lambda \mathbb{E}_H[a_i]}{N_\lambda} \int \Delta_0(s) dF_1^0(s) + \frac{\phi \lambda \mathbb{E}_H[a_i]}{Q_\lambda} \int \Delta_1(s) dF_0^\lambda(s), \quad (35)$$

where $\Delta_j(s) = \frac{1}{2}[(F_C - F_j^0)(s) + (F_C - F_j^0)(s^-)] \geq 0$ by Assumption 1. The second stated condition makes the first term strictly positive; the first stated condition makes the second term strictly positive, because $N_\lambda F_0^\lambda = N_0 F_0^0 + \phi \lambda \mathbb{E}_H[a_i] F_C$ dominates $N_0 F_0^0$ as a measure, so every set with positive non-defaulter mass under the naive rule retains positive mass after smoothing. $\square$

B.6 Precision-at-top- p

For $\lambda < \bar{\lambda}_{\text{rank}}$, precision-at-top- p equals $Q_\lambda F_1^\lambda(s_p)/\hat{p}$, with the cutoff s_p and realized share $\hat{p}$ fixed by Lemma 2 and top-group membership fixed by Lemma 1; it depends on the default rate as well as the rank distributions, so it is not a rank-separation metric in the sense of Definition 2. It nonetheless falls with smoothing below the threshold. By the numerator identity behind (25),

$$Q_\lambda F_1^\lambda(s_p) = Q_0 F_1^0(s_p) - \phi \lambda \mathbb{E}_H[a_i] F_C(s_p), \quad (36)$$

which is strictly decreasing in λ whenever $F_C(s_p) > 0$. Part of that decline reflects the mechanically lower default rate rather than a worse ranking.